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FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION-COMPENSATION-EXTRA COMPENSATION AND
THE RULE AGAINST SELF-DEALING-Respondent was a member of a firm of
certified public accountants who were actively engaged in assisting decedent
work out his income 1:ax difficulties at the time of his death. Under decedent's will respondent was named executor and trustee along with
decedent's lawyer and a trust company. The executors employed respondent's partnership to perform services in connection with the estate. The
surviving widow and life beneficiary of the estate filed objections to the
account of the executors, urging that the rule against self-dealing on the
part of fiduciaries precluded respondent from recovering for services performed as an accountant in addition to his duties as an executor. On appeal
from a decree of surrogate's court overruling 1:his objection, held, affirmed, subject to modification. The respondent was entitled to extra
compensation for his services as an accountant in addition to his compensation as executor and trustee, but only to the extent that the court
considered reasonable and fair. In re Tuttle's Will, 4 App. Div. (2d) 310,
164 N.Y.S. (2d) 573 (1957).
The general rule in New York, as recognized by the principal case,
is that compensation for executors and administrators is strictly limited
to that provided by statute,1 and it has even been suggested that "there can

1 Collier v. Munn, 41 N.Y. 143 (1869); Pyle v. Pyle, 137 App. Div. 568, 122 N.Y.S.
256 (1910); In re Hayes' Estate, 102 N.Y.S. {2d) 111 (1951).
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be no exception to this rule." 2 The rule is based on the public policy which
prohibits a fiduciary from hiring himself to perform additional services for
the estate, in order to prevent a conflict of interests which might lead to a
breach of the duty of Ioyalty.3 The duty of loyalty theory has been accepted
by a number of other states in denying extra compensation,4 even where
the court recognized that the executor was the most competent person who
could have been obtained to render the services.5 The principal case states,
however, that the courts of New York have avoided this general rule under
"varying circumstances." Authority cited to illustrate these "varying circumstances" includes holdings that the general rule was not applicable where the
will specifically provided for extra compensation,6 where there was an agreement between the beneficiaries and the executor for extra services,7 or where
the services performed were entirely disconnected from the duties of the
executor.8 The principal case does not fall within these exceptions, however. The majority of cases relied upon by the court involved payment of a
salary to an executor and trustee who had acted, over an extended time, as
an officer of a corporation or business owned by the estate.9 Since the court
did not discuss this point, it is not clear whether it would recognize a
distinction between the salary cases and the cases involving the rendering
of professional services for clearing up immediate administrative problems
for the estate, as in the principal case. It would appear, however, that

2 Matter of Popp, 123 App. Div. 2, 107 N.Y.S. 277 (1907). The rule is a:Iso applicable
where it is the executor's .firm that is employed, according to Parker v. Day, 155 N.Y.
383, 49 N:E. 1046 (1898).
3 Collier v. Munn, note I supra; Pyle v. Pyle, note I supra. Another basis for the rule,
stated in Matter of Popp, note 2 supra, is that statutes providing compensation for executors and administrators are in derogation of the English common law rule, adopted
in New York, against allowing any compensation whatever, and as such are to be strictly
construed. But the English rule was not adopted by all states. See Turnbull v. Pomeroy,
140 Mass. 117, 3 N.E. 15 (1885).
4 Willard v. Bassett, 27 Ill. 37 (1861); Taylor v. Wright, 93 Ind. 121 (1883); Needham
v. Needham, 34 Idaho 193, 200 P. 346 (1921); Estate of Parker, 200 Cal. 132, 251 P. 907
(1926); Lightner v. Boone, 221 N.C. 78, 19 S.E. (2d) 144 (1942).
5 Holding v. Allen, 150 Tenn. 669, 266 S.W. 772 (1924).
6 Matter of Froelich's Estate, 122 App. Div. 440, 107 N.Y.S. 173 (1907).
7 Matter of McCord's Will, 2 App. Div. 324, 37 N.Y.S. 852 (1896).
s Lent v. Howard, 89 N.Y. 169 (1882). Executors and trustees managed farm property
of the estate for 15 years and were allowed compensation therefor. Matter of Popp,
note 2 supra, distinguished this case on the ground that the will imposed no duty to
manage the property, but only to sell it, and thus the services rendered were entirely
disconnected from fiduciary duties. As the Popp case pointed out, at 107 N.Y.S. 278,
"It is not enough that he [the executor and trustee] does something . . . which he has
a right to employ another to do and pay him for out of the estate." The facts of the
principal case fall within the language quoted and, thus, would be subject to the
general rule according to the Popp case.
9,Matter of Berri's Will, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N.Y.S. 466 (1927); Matter of Gerbereux's
Will, 148 Misc. 461, 266 N.Y.S. 134 (1933); In re Smyth's Estate, 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 605 (1942);
In re Gould's Estate, 116 N.Y.S. (2d) 269 (1952); Matter of Block, 186 Misc. 945, 60 N.Y.S.
(2d) 639 (1946).
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the New York courts have treated the salary cases differently from those
involving professional services.10 It has been in the area of professional
services that those courts have been the most outspoken against extra
compensation, particularly in the situations involving attorney-executors. 11
In only one case cited did the court allow extra compensation in a situation
similar to that of the principal case. 12
The principal case is significant in illustrating the impractical effect
that might result if the court blindly applied the duty of loyalty theory
to deny extra compensation. The court here emphasized the fact that the
respondent had been actively engaged in attempting to extricate the testator
from complex income tax problems at the time he was named executor.13
To require the executors to employ a strange firm of accountants, unfamiliar with the estate's problems, would result in added costs to the estate and
would prolong its administration. Professor Atkinson has suggested that
while the duty of loyalty theory is good as a theory, in practice it results in
inefficiency in administration of the estate.14 As to the conflict of interests
problem involved in allowing extra compensation, it has been said that
requiring the court to pass upon claims for such compensation is sufficient
protection to the beneficiaries.15 The New York Surrogate's Court, in
construing a statute providing for extra compensation for attorneys,16 recognized the force of this argument by stating that the provisions of the
statute did not depart from the public policy against self-dealing because
it required that any claim for extra compensation be subject to the scrutiny
of the court, which could discover and eliminate any improper or excessive charges.17 The principal case illustrates the fact that this reasoning
can also be applied where there is no statute providing for extra compensation.18 There are decisions in other states that have recognized that
there is no impropriety in allowing an executor to perform professional
services for the estate.19 Some states have enacted statutes allowing extra

10 Unfortunately, none of the salary cases found specifically discuss this distinction
as being the ground for treating the salary cases as exceptional. It consistently appeared
in those cases, however, that the court allowed extra compensation only where the
executor had operated a business or corporation over an extended time.
11 Collier v. Munn, note 1 supra. But see New York Surrogate's Court Act (1920) §285,
for statutory abrogation of the attorney-executor rule.
12 Matter of Adolf Wexler, 125 _N.Y.L.J. 190 (1951). The surrogate's court allowed
extra compensation to an accountant on facts similar to that of the principal case.
13 Matter of Adolf Wexler, note 12 supra, also emphasized that the accountant was
an old friend of the decedent, highly familiar with his tax problems.
14 ATKINSON, WILLS, 2d ed., 656 (1953).
1541 VA. L. REv. 119 at 135 (1955); ATKINSON, WILIS, 2d ed., 656 (1953).
16New York Surrogate's Court Act (1920) §285.
17 In re Maas' £state, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 261 (1942).
18 Any interested party can file objections to the executor's account and the court
did, in fact, cut down the amount claimed to about one-third the fee demanded.
19 Swank v. Reherd, 181 Va. 943, 27 S.E. (2d) 191 (1943); Jones v. Peabody, 182 Wash.
148, 45 P. (2d) 915 (1935), noted in 49 HARv. L. REv. 337 (1935).
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compensation.20 Such statutes may show the development of a belief that
the rule against self-dealing is not necessarily violated by allowing the
executor to perform extra services. The result in ·the principal case indicates
that even in New York, where the courts have argued so strongly against
extra compensation in the past, the court will not allow the duty of -loyalty
theory to stand in the way of efficient administration of the estate.

David Shute

20 See ATKINSON, WILLS,

2d ed., 656 (1953) and 49 HARv. L. R.Ev. 337 (1935).

